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The state, especially in emerging economies, plays a key role in influencing firm 
behaviour, including outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). Often literature on 
the state’s influence on OFDI stresses direct state ownership. However, the state 
can influence OFDI in several ways, including policy support and subsidies; the 
literature has largely overlooked these effects. We build on key insights from the 
comparative capitalisms literature to put forward a series of propositions on how 
home-country measures – in both emerging and developed economies – to boost 
OFDI will influence, inter alia, the volume, location and mode of firms’ investments 
abroad. We thus contribute to the literature by showing how government policies 
across a wide range of countries influence an important aspect of firm behaviour 
that has economic, social and environmental implications. 
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1. Introduction
The international business literature has long recognized how the home country can 
influence domestic firms’ outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). For instance, 
it has shown how home-country norms shape the location and timing of OFDI 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), and how the state can influence the capabilities of 
internationally competitive domestic firms (Narula, 1993). However, although this 
body of literature has put home-country effects centre stage, it has so far paid 
limited systematic attention to how home-country measures that states implement 
to support domestic firms’ OFDI vary and how this variation, in turn, affects OFDI.
This rise of emerging-market multinational companies (EMNCs) has led to a focus 
on the state’s role in economic activity (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss & Zheng, 
2007; Ibeh, 2018; Peng, 2012; Zhang, Zhou & Ebbers, 2011). Much of the empirical 
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research has focused on how either the home country, in general, or direct state 
ownership, in particular, influences emerging-market firms’ investments abroad 
(Buckley, Cross, Tan, Xin & Voss, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Zhang et 
al., 2011).
Although some studies examine how home-country measures (HCMs) that the 
state implements to support companies’ foreign investments shape OFDI (Luo, 
Xue & Han, 2010; Narula, 1993; Torres, Clegg & Varum, 2016), such studies are 
limited in number. In addition, these efforts focus on emerging-market firms, often 
Chinese ones (Jormanainen & Koveshnikov, 2012). However, there is no a priori 
reason to assume that it is only emerging-market states that support firms’ OFDI 
strategies (Fiedler & Karlsson, 2016; Narula, 1993). Indeed, in an era of increasing 
nationalism and the questioning of international free-trade agreements, there 
may be a role for the state in developed economies as well as emerging ones to 
promote overseas investment for the purpose of accessing knowledge and other 
capabilities (Mathews, 2006; Welfens & Baier, 2018). Significant research gaps 
remain, therefore, related to how states – both developed- and emerging-market 
ones – vary in their support for OFDI and what effect this variation is likely to have 
on patterns of OFDI. 
In this paper we seek to address these gaps conceptually through a range 
of propositions that combine recent advances in international business with 
longstanding insights from international policy papers and the comparative 
capitalisms (CC) literature. Drawing on policy papers from the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) that coined the term “home-
country measures” (HCMs), we define and conceptualize home-country support 
for firms’ investments abroad. We draw particularly on the work of Sauvant et al. 
(2014), which provides a comprehensive review of policy papers on HCMs. We 
combine that effort with insights from the CC literature to identify how HCMs differ 
across countries and, more importantly, how HCMs affect OFDI. Building on four 
crucial tenets of CC analysis, we illustrate how HCMs are likely to influence OFDI 
patterns. 
Our work makes three contributions. First, we help to explain OFDI patterns 
by examining the variation and consequences of HCMs, a relatively neglected 
influence on firms’ investments abroad. Second and building on the first point, our 
work demonstrates the importance of taking HCM variation seriously, both across 
and within countries. Third, we illustrate how HCMs (1) can fundamentally alter 
the strategic priorities of firms and (2) should be conceptualized as configurations 
of several measures rather than as individual ones, challenging best practice 
suggestions of the past (UNCTAD, 2001) and sensitizing policymakers and 
researchers to the need to assess – as well as the challenges involved in examining 
– the OFDI effects of HCMs. 
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The remainder of this paper has three sections. Section 2 reviews key strands of 
the international business literature: the country-of-origin perspective, important 
theories of OFDI and recent perspectives on the nature of EMNCs. While 
recognizing the important contributions of these three strands of the literature, we 
address their shortcomings in section 3 by introducing complementary insights 
from HCM policy papers and the CC literature. In that section, we put forward four 
broad propositions that set out the principles that are likely to shape the relationship 
between HCM variation and OFDI. We anticipate that more focused hypotheses 
will build on each of these propositions; to illustrate how the propositions can be 
used, we put forward one hypothesis for each proposition. Section 4 concludes, 
summarizes our contribution to the literature and sets out the implications for 
policymakers, managers and future research. 
2. Review of the International Business Literature
We focus on four important strands of the literature: country-of-origin perspectives, 
OFDI theories within the international business literature, the “double diamond” 
framework and recent perspectives on the nature of EMNCs. We show that, while all 
four propose relationships between some aspects of the multinational corporation’s 
(MNC’s) home country and its investments abroad, there is little systematic 
treatment of how countries differ in terms of HCMs and how this variation is likely 
to affect OFDI patterns.
2.1 The Country-of-Origin Effect 
The country-of-origin effect potentially explains a wide range of behavioural aspects 
of the internationalizing firm, such as MNCs’ product perceptions, knowledge 
transfer propensity, strategy and structure, and coordination modes, as well as the 
constitution of their work systems and production models (Elango & Sethi, 2007; 
Ferner & Quintanilla, 1998; Geppert, Williams & Matten, 2003; Harzing & Sorge, 
2003). A substantial body of work shows that MNEs’ country of origin influences 
OFDI patterns (Tan & Meyer, 2011).
The theories underpinning country-of-origin contributions vary substantially. While 
some contributions use the home country as an explanatory variable with little 
theoretical grounding, others use theory extensively, with culturalist and comparative 
theories often dominating. These country-of-origin perspectives have taught us a 
lot about how the home country influences MNE behaviour (Buckley, 1996; Chen, 
2015; Dunning, 1992; Young & Hood, 1992). We see country-of-origin perspectives 
that are based on the CC perspective and that build on seminal insights from the 
broader international literature, such as the importance of the state in explaining 
OFDI (Dunning, 1992; Stopford, 1994; Young & Hood, 1992; Zhan, 1995), as a 
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fruitful starting point for understanding the constitution and consequences of HCMs, 
because they have tended to focus on national institutional settings to explain firm 
behaviour. We therefore build our understanding of home-country support on 
institutional foundations and extend it to include the important role of HCMs. 
2.2 OFDI Theories 
This section briefly assesses important OFDI theories, focusing on the extent to 
which they consider the home context in general and HCMs in particular to explain 
OFDI patterns. We will discuss the classical mainstream approaches first and then 
move on to more recent theories on EMNCs’ OFDI. 
2.2.1 Hymer’s Theory of the Multinational Firm
Hymer’s (1960) theory of the multinational firm seeks to explain why firms invest 
abroad. Drawing on industrial organization theory, Hymer (1960) asserts that 
MNCs have monopolistic advantages, such as privileged access to capital or 
other resources, economies of scale or government concessions (Forsgren, 
2009). Consequently, firms may be able to invest abroad because they can exploit 
those monopolistic advantages internationally (Forsgren, 2009: 28). This early 
seminal work is not particularly concerned with the state’s activities to promote 
OFDI. Importantly, proponents of internalization theory, who build strongly on 
Hymer’s ideas of market imperfections, have focused on the role of home-market 
imperfections to explain EMNCs’ OFDI (Buckley, 2018; Rugman, Nguyen, & Wei, 
2016). They have not, however, examined HCMs.
2.2.2 Johansson and Vahlne’s Uppsala model
Johanson & Vahlne’s (1977) work seeks to explain OFDI processes through the 
lens of learning and contextual distance. Firms move gradually from more to less 
familiar foreign contexts and their foreign investments move from low to increasingly 
high commitment. Whereas the former involves moving first into neighbouring 
countries before entering more distant target markets, the latter is a process that 
starts with exports, moves into initial foreign investment in sales subsidiaries and 
ends in fully fledged production sites abroad. This approach has been criticized. 
For instance, contributions on EMNCs’ OFDI (e.g. Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009) 
have argued that contemporary firms often venture almost instantly into radically 
distant environments and also choose high-commitment modes of entry early on. 
The Uppsala model (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 2009), therefore, tends to overlook 
the state’s proactive promotion of OFDI and how that action can lead to investments 
in unfamiliar cultural contexts and that do not build on existing company strengths 
(Hennart, 2012; Mathews, 2006).
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2.2.3 Dunning’s OLI model
Dunning’s (1988) “eclectic paradigm”, or OLI model, focuses on the necessary 
conditions for firms to engage in FDI, arguing that three conditions need to be 
met: firms need an ownership advantage (O), a locational advantage (L) and an 
internalization advantage (I). Ownership advantages can differ in kind and can 
involve, for instance, trademarks, production technique or entrepreneurial skills. 
The possession of ownership advantages is the most basic requirement for 
OFDI; without it, a firm cannot overcome its liability of foreignness in the foreign 
context. However, EMNCs’ OFDI raises questions about the need for firms to have 
organizational advantages before investing abroad. Similarly, the OLI framework 
does not explain the emergence, development and maintenance of ownership 
advantages, consequently downplaying the institutionally conditioned creation, 
change and continuation of organizational capabilities (Whitley, 1999). 
Responding to such criticisms, Dunning & Lundan (2008, 2010) incorporated 
institutional analysis into the OLI framework, suggesting a potential link between 
national institutions in both home and host countries and their influence on the 
kinds of organizational advantages firms are likely to develop. Despite these 
developments, the OLI model does not focus in detail on particular policies and 
HCMs and how they influence OFDI. This is different to Rugman’s work, which 
focuses on the nexus between country- and firm-specific advantages.  
2.2.4 Rugman’s FSA-CSA framework 
The last major theory of OFDI is Rugman’s (1981) FSA-CSA matrix or framework, 
which aims to explain the key drivers and sources of competitive advantages 
of the internationalizing firm. The starting point of the framework is a distinction 
between firm-specific advantages (FSAs) and country-specific advantages (CSAs). 
FSAs include, for instance, brands, managerial resources and skills, and systems 
integration, which are unique and idiosyncratic to the firm. CSAs can be advantages 
that have little to do with a firm’s capabilities, but that benefit the firm because of its 
location. Such advantages may involve access to natural resources or low labour 
costs.
It is the interplay and recombination of CSAs and FSAs that drives OFDI and offers 
a key source of MNEs’ competitive advantage (Rugman, 1988). However, it can 
be difficult to achieve. Focusing on China, Rugman, Nguyen & Wei (2016) have 
argued that the types of FSAs that Chinese firms develop stem from home CSAs, 
including low-cost labour, cheap financing, a large home market and privileged 
access to natural resources within China. They conclude that strong reliance on 
home-country and government support may have helped some Chinese firms to 
invest abroad but has not been sufficient to enable them to combine home-country 
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FSAs with host-country CSAs. Rugman’s work, hence, highlights the difficulties 
that firms face when seeking to combine FSAs and home and host CSAs, but does 
not focus specifically on HCMs.
2.3 Extensions of Porter’s Diamond
A further strand of the international business literature builds on Porter’s (1990) 
diamond to develop a “double diamond” model (D’Agostino & Santangelo, 2012; 
Ghauri & Santangelo, 2012; Rugman & Verbeke, 2003), which can help to explain, 
inter alia, OFDI. Porter’s diamond focuses on firm strategy, structure and rivalry; 
factor conditions; demand conditions; and related and supporting industries, to 
explain the competitiveness of industries in different countries. The double diamond 
model has two key elements that Porter’s framework downplays (Rugman & 
D’Cruz, 1993; Rugman & Verbeke, 1993, 2003). First, to be successful abroad, 
internationally competitive firms do not rely only on their home country’s strengths. 
Often the interaction between resources located in different countries can explain 
companies’ international success (Rugman & Verbeke, 1993). Second and more 
specifically, companies often undertake OFDI to access knowledge, expertise and 
resources that their domestic market does not provide (Rugman & Verbeke, 2001).
2.4  Emerging-market multinationals and the role of the home country
The growing importance of EMNCs’ FDI has led to analyses of home countries 
and their influence on domestic firms’ investments abroad (Buckley et al., 2007; 
Buckley, 2018; Chen, 2015; Pradhan, 2016). Indeed, without examining the home 
country’s role, it is difficult to explain such firms’ OFDI. The global shift in OFDI 
patterns has led to two theoretical developments. First, proponents of classical 
theories of international investment examined the role of states and home-country 
institutions in greater detail (Buckley, 2018; Dunning, Kim & Park, 2008; Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008, 2010; Rugman, 2009). Second, recent work has put forward new 
theories and empirical analyses specifically tailored towards explaining emerging-
market firms’ OFDI (Chen, 2015; Hennart, 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 
2006; Ramamurti, 2009, 2012). 
Although amended classical theories and new theories on EMNCs posit different 
drivers of OFDI and firms’ competitive advantages in foreign markets (Buckley, 
2018; Hennart, 2012), they share an emphasis on the constraining or enabling role 
of home-country institutions. These institutions are often seen as being directly 
linked to – if not equated with – the state’s behaviour in the home country. Hence, 
the literature has increasingly focused on the importance of the state to explain 
emerging-market OFDI, but very few studies examine the policies that states have 
in place to promote OFDI in both emerging and developed economies.
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For instance, a few studies focus on China and provide a comprehensive review 
of HCMs (Li, et al., 2013; Luo & Rui, 2009; Luo et al., 2010). Some of these cover 
a wide range of HCMs, including various fiscal incentives, such as tax rebates 
and subsidized loans, insurance against political threats, support from government 
agencies, treaties to protect investment abroad, and help to deal with host-country 
governments and to conform to free-trade agreements, such as WTO protocols 
(Luo & Rui, 2009; Luo et al., 2010). 
In sum, OFDI theories have begun to acknowledge the home country’s important role. 
However, there is little systematic understanding of how HCMs differ across countries 
and how divergent HCMs, in turn, affect OFDI (Buckley, 2018; Sauvant et al., 2014). 
This gap in the literature is all the more surprising as “HCMs can potentially influence, 
among other things, the volume, quality, mode of investment, type of investor, sector 
of investment, and location of OFDI” (Sauvant et al., 2014: 3).
3. Towards a framework of HCM variation and consequences
3.1 Classifications of HCMs
International organizations, notably UNCTAD and the OECD, were among the 
first to acknowledge the importance of HCMs in explaining OFDI. The initial focus 
rested on the question of how to incentivize MNCs to invest in developing countries 
(OECD, 1983, 1993; UNCTAD, 2001). Consequently, UNCTAD published a range of 
papers defining HCMs and discussing their possible effect on FDI in terms of quality 
and quantity in developing countries. In general, UNCTAD (2001: 65) understood 
HCMs as
[A]ll policy measures taken by the home countries of firms that choose to 
invest abroad designed to encourage FDI flows to other countries. Their 
formulation and application may involve both home- and host-country 
government and private sector organizations. 
HCMs can exist at the national, regional and multilateral levels and involve a broad 
variety of measures, ranging from information provision, technical assistance and 
capacity-building to financial, fiscal and insurance measures, investment-related 
trade policies, schemes to promote the transfer of technology and investment 
insurance (UNCTAD, 2001: 11).
Sauvant et al. (2014: 11–12) define HCMs as advantages provided by home 
governments that are “meant to facilitate, support or promote outward FDI”. 
Drawing on a comprehensive review of policy papers, Sauvant et al. (2014) were 
among the first to examine how HCMs vary. They identified five characteristics 
to distinguish between HCMs. HCMs can be (1) direct or indirect, (2) provided 
by government and non-government actors, (3) grouped into broad categories of 
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support and the types of institutional actors that often provide them, (4) different in 
terms of their objectives and (5) different in their level of development, coherence 
and integration. 
Sauvant et al.’s first distinction is between indirect and direct HCMs. Direct HCMs 
aim to support domestic firms’ OFDI through information and other support 
services, financial measures and fiscal measures. Indirect measures are subsidies 
or measures that are related to trade and market access. Sauvant et al.’s second 
characteristic underscores that the private sector may have a role to play in 
stimulating OFDI; however, this is not the focus of their framework, which excludes 
non-governmental measures that aim to promote OFDI (Sauvant et al., 2014: 20).
The focus of Sauvant et al.’s third characteristic is on how government-related HCMs 
can be grouped into broad categories of support (information and support services, 
financial and fiscal measures, investment insurance measures and treaties) and the 
types of institutional actors that typically provide them (government departments 
and ministries, export credit agencies and development finance institutions, and 
investment and trade promotion agencies, as well as private organizations fulfilling 
government mandates).
Sauvant et al.’s fourth characteristic highlights how, apart from the obvious variation 
in HCM type, HCMs differ in their objectives. Such objectives can span a wide 
spectrum, ranging from more developmental goals for the host country to the 
promotion, primarily, of home-country economic interests. These objectives are 
typically reflected in the eligibility criteria and conditions that are often attached to 
HCMs, such as protecting the home country’s economy as well as developmental, 
environmental, cultural or social considerations. Sauvant et al.’s fifth characteristic 
suggests that HCMs vary in their proactive promotion by the state, their transparency 
and, more importantly, their coherence and integration. This suggests that the 
interactions of HCMs are important. 
In summary, Sauvant et al.’s (2014) work provides an extensive discussion of 
HCM variation. However, they do not provide a theoretical or analytical basis on 
which to assess how HCM variation influences OFDI. As we show in the next 
section, CC analysis is particularly useful for providing this basis, so that a more 
systematic analytical framework can be put forward to examine the effects of 
HCMs on OFDI. 
3.2 Comparative Capitalisms and Home-Country Measures 
We rely on the CC literature to develop a better understanding of how HCMs 
vary and how that variance relates to OFDI patterns. Before discussing these 
antecedents and consequences of HCM variation, we outline why the CC literature 
is a valuable one to review.
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There are different strands within the CC literature. Among the best known and most 
widely cited ones are the National Business System, the Varieties of Capitalism and 
the Societal Effect approaches (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Maurice, Sorge & Warner, 
1980; Whitley, 1999). Although these approaches vary in a number of ways (Allen, 
2014), they share the basic premise that firms’ priorities, capabilities and behaviour 
can only be understood within their home-country institutional contexts (Jackson, 
2010; Whitley, 1987). Hence, the predominant perspective on institutions has been 
to examine how configurations of formal institutions at the national level influence 
firms (Allen, 2013; Whitley, 2005a). On the basis of divergent institutional settings 
and, hence, dominant firm types and firm relations within different countries, 
CC approaches distinguish between various categories of market economy 
(Hall & Soskice, 2001; Maurice, Sorge & Warner, 1980; Whitley, 1999). Since its first 
expressions, the CC literature has seen some important revisions. Among the most 
important are that firms are not passive agents but influence institutions as much 
as they are influenced by them (Hancké, Rhodes & Thatcher, 2007). It has also 
been recognized that national institutional settings are neither static nor necessarily 
homogeneous within a national economy (Allen, 2013; Whitley, 2009).
Nevertheless, what has remained a constant in this body of literature is the importance 
of institutional configurations (institutions as interconnected combinations rather 
than collections of discrete entities) as well as firm-institutional relationships to 
explain firm behaviour. Hence, four elements within the CC literature are particularly 
important: the mutual constitution of institutions and actors, complementarity, 
sectoral heterogeneity and the role of the state. We discuss their implications for 
HCM variation and the consequences for OFDI in the following subsections.
3.3.1 Mutual constitution of institutions and actors
Rather than seeing institutions and collective actors, such as firms, as separate 
entities, the CC literature builds on key insights from sociological theory, such as 
those of (Giddens, 1984) and (Simmel, 1955), to argue that individuals define or 
shape the social groups to which they belong and social groups define or shape 
their members (Jackson, 2010). In other words, neither is more important than the 
other: each co-constitutes the other (Jackson, 2010). 
This has profound implications for how we view firms and how we seek to explain 
their behaviour. For instance, important national institutions not only encourage or 
discourage certain actions by firms; they also shape the fundamental nature of firms, 
their objectives and their abilities to carry out particular actions (Jackson, 2010; 
Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Whitley, 2010a). As a result, the CC literature highlights 
how key national institutions, such as corporate governance and the role of the 
state, constitute as well as constrain or enable firm behaviour both at home and 
abroad (Jaehrling et al., 2018; Lane & Wood, 2009; Tüselmann, Allen & McDonald, 
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2015). Consequently, it shows that the nature of firms varies between institutional 
contexts (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Lange et al., 2015; Maurice et al., 1980; Whitley, 
1999). For instance, corporate governance regulations influence who has a say in 
important strategic decisions, shaping the firm’s priorities and its capabilities (Goyer, 
2011; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 2010a). In other words, key institutions do not 
exist separately from firms, but are part of them, fundamentally shaping the nature 
of firms and their priorities; institutions do not just act as incentives or disincentives 
for firms that are, generally, homogeneous (Jackson, 2010; Whitley, 2010a).
Applied to HCMs, this view suggests that the state, as the “group” in Simmel’s 
terms, is constituted by and constitutes the firms and other organizations that 
enact its policies and that are its “members”. Therefore, the state’s priorities, as 
embodied in HCMs, become the priorities of those companies that are involved in, 
or wish to be involved in, trying to achieve the state’s objectives. One corollary of 
this is that, depending on the role of the state in the economy, we cannot assume 
that firms in all countries are profit maximizers. If the state plays a dominant role 
in shaping economic development, those firms that are expected to contribute 
towards achieving the state’s objectives are likely to have socio-political as well as 
commercial aims.  
For instance, the Chinese word lishu signifies a sense of “belonging to” or “directly 
controlled by” (Buckley, 2018). Such a relationship exists between the Chinese 
state and some domestic companies; therefore, in those firms, the state can 
have a direct influence not only on senior management appointments but also on 
major projects, such as OFDI (Buckley, 2018). As a result, HCMs signal to firms 
the state’s priorities. Lishu is likely to mean that the strategic priorities of some 
Chinese firms reflect political rather than solely commercial objectives, resulting 
potentially in investments abroad that would not otherwise have occurred. Of 
course, not all OFDI by Chinese or other emerging-market firms will be influenced 
in this way (Voss, Buckley & Cross, 2010), but some will (Ramamurti & Hillemann, 
2018). For instance, the Chinese state has influenced the location of OFDI and the 
type of companies that invest in particular projects abroad. China’s One Belt One 
Road initiative, which is related to a government-backed $10 billion credit line to 
support Chinese investment (an HCM) (Tonchev, 2017), has led to an increase in 
OFDI in those countries that fall within the initiative, with state-owned companies 
playing a leading role in infrastructure sectors and private firms being more active in 
acquisitions not related to infrastructure (Du & Zhang, 2018).
This perspective suggests that political objectives associated with HCMs in some 
countries and variation, more broadly, in eligibility criteria and in conditionality – in 
terms of the host countries that attract, for example, funding or tax advantages 
associated with HCMs – in other countries will not just provide incentives to firms 
in general to invest overseas, but may inherently alter the strategic priorities of 
some firms. In other words, an HCM to promote OFDI into a particular country 
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or region may not only enhance the attractiveness of investing in that country or 
region for domestic firms, but also may fundamentally alter some domestic firms’ 
strategic priorities, potentially influencing the geographical focus of their OFDI and, 
hence, both their spatially specific objectives as well as their overall priorities. Thus, 
HCMs and the conditions associated with them may encourage some firms (but 
not others) to invest in particular geographical locations or technologies (Sauvant & 
Chen, 2014). Conversely, eligibility and conditionality criteria may discourage some 
firms from using HCMs due to their constraining nature (Sauvant & Chen, 2014). 
We, therefore, put forward the following proposition:
P1: HCMs will influence OFDI patterns (types of actors, volume, location, technology 
area, mode of entry).
This broad proposition suggests that HCMs will encourage some firms to undertake 
investments overseas (either in particular countries or technologies) that they would 
not otherwise have carried out. One possible hypothesis that can be derived from 
this: HCMs will increase the volume of OFDI to politically favoured locations.
3.3.2 Complementarity 
The CC literature highlights how institutions interact with one another; they should 
be seen as systems rather than as discrete entities with individual and independent 
effects (Goyer, Clark & Bhankaraully, 2016; Jackson & Deeg, 2008), raising the 
importance of complementarity (Deeg, 2005; Wood, Deeg & Wilkinson, 2014). 
Prominent analytical approaches within the CC literature rely on typological 
theories, arguing that firm behaviour differs as a result of variation in countries along 
a number of dimensions (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999). Consequently, these 
approaches implicitly draw on Weberian ideal types (Weber, 1949). At the heart 
of ideal types are the dimensions along which a set of ideal types, which forms 
a typology, vary (Doty & Glick, 1994). Within the CC literature, some important 
dimensions along which different types of capitalism exist are the role of the state 
in economic activity, the degree of centralization of wage negotiations and the 
relative importance of stock markets in corporate financing (Hall & Soskice, 2001; 
Whitley, 2005a). Each ideal type should be an internally coherent and logical model 
that shows the combination of dimensions that are distinct to each ideal type 
(Weber, 1949). However, in a typology, the ideal types are interrelated, because 
they vary along the same dimensions, making them different to classification 
systems (Doty & Glick, 1994). In addition, typologies should provide a logical or 
theoretical argument to explain why each ideal type’s dimensional patterns leads to 
a particular outcome (Doty & Glick, 1994). For instance, the Varieties of Capitalism 
framework relies heavily on, but differs from, transaction cost economics to explain 
how contrasting national institutional regimes result in patterns of comparative 
advantage (Allen, 2004; Hall & Soskice, 2001). 
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A corollary of this typological theorizing is that how one institution shapes firm 
behaviour depends on the other institutions that are present (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). 
This can lead to systems of institutions that may either mutually reinforce one another 
(Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999) or compensate for one another, so that one 
institution may overcome the “deficiencies” of another (Crouch et al., 2005). 
When institutions reinforce one another in a country, their effects are greater together 
than the effects of the institutions individually (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999). 
Applied to HCMs, this kind of complementarity suggests that the institutional 
complementarity in a country may translate into different levels of coherence 
among the different HCMs. Coherence may, in turn, have a strong effect on the 
scale and scope of OFDI. This echoes Sauvant et al.’s (2014) work on HCMs as 
more or less coherent and integrated systems. For instance, one HCM by itself may 
have only a limited influence, but when coupled with one or more other HCMs, its 
influence could be quite substantial. Theoretically, then, one HCM (say, information 
support) may increase OFDI a little but when coupled with another (such as loans) 
may increase it a lot. HCMs may also stipulate or at least influence the mode of 
OFDI (joint ventures or wholly owned subsidiaries). Again, if the foci of other HCMs 
reinforce a particular mode of OFDI, the effects could be substantial. 
The alternative view of complementarity suggests that one institution may make up 
for the deficiencies of another (Crouch et al., 2005). For instance, in the CC literature, 
strong, active labour-market policies in a country may “compensate” workers for a 
lack of strong employment rights, enabling workers to maintain their skills, expertise 
and employment as they are able to find work with different employers (Kristensen, 
2016). Applied to HCMs, this insight suggests that some HCMs may make up for 
the absence or inadequacy of other HCMs. Therefore, research should examine 
how particular configurations of HCMs – rather than individual HCMs – may lead to 
the same outcomes. In other words, different sets of HCMs may have equifinality or 
the same result. They may, of course, have different outcomes as well.
Instead of complementing one another, HCMs and the eligibility criteria and other 
conditions associated with them may work against one another or be incoherent. 
As a result, the configuration of institutions may in some ways be complementary 
but in other respects may be incoherent, making for a complex set of causes that 
lead to particular outcomes. For instance, China’s policy framework supports OFDI, 
but inefficient administrative procedures can impede investments abroad; despite 
these limitations, state-owned enterprises seem to benefit from HCMs more than 
other types of firms (Sauvant & Chen, 2014). In other words, although some 
institutions promote OFDI, they interact with unclear administrative remits to hinder 
OFDI; however, the impact of these interactions varies depending on the type of 
firm that is seeking to engage in investment abroad. Drawing on these two views 
of complementarity and incoherency, we put forward the following proposition, 
in broad terms: 
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P2: HCMs collectively and configurationally (rather than individually and additively) 
will influence patterns of OFDI.
One hypothesis that follows logically from this proposition is that, for example, 
government grants to firms to set up overseas facilities will moderate (enhance) the 
positive effects of tax deferral policies for income earned abroad on OFDI. Such a 
hypothesis highlights how HCMs are likely to interact with one another rather than 
act individually, with each having a direct effect on OFDI that is neither moderated 
nor mediated by other HCMs.
3.3.3 The role of the state 
The third insight from the CC literature is the importance of the role of the state. 
Typologies of the state’s involvement in economic activity are manifold, ranging 
from “predatory” states (Evans, 1995) to “segmented business systems” (Wood & 
Frynas, 2006) to “arm’s length”, “dominant-developmental” and “corporatist” states 
(Whitley, 2005a). As discussed in more detail below, any state’s involvement in 
economic and commercial activities is likely to be sector specific, so these labels 
should be treated with care as they are unlikely to reflect the actual role of the state 
and its variation across economic sectors (Allen, Allen & Lange, 2018; Thurbon & 
Weiss, 2006; Wade, 2012). 
Arm’s length states, in their ideal typical forms, seek to achieve a level playing field 
for all firms, so that no firms are directly advantaged or disadvantaged by the state. 
This means that such states, as ideal types, do not intervene directly in any firm 
or firms’ activities; they do not seek to shape investment decisions, for example, 
in favour of particular technologies or geographical areas. By contrast, dominant-
developmental states, again as ideal types, pursue a strategic and active role in 
the economy, offering financial or other incentives to specific firms or sectors to 
encourage the growth of those firms and sectors and/or chosen technologies (Allen 
et al., 2018; Whitley, 2005a). Corporatist states, as ideal types, have a significant, 
direct role in economic development. In contrast to both arm’s length and dominant-
developmental states, corporatist states recognize that independent organizations, 
such as unions and business associations, can at times play important roles in 
helping to shape economic policy and implementation (Whitley, 2005a).
The different roles that states can play in guiding (or not guiding) economic 
development are likely to have important implications for any HCMs that they adopt, 
particularly regarding their directness. Arm’s length states, by definition, are less 
likely than any of the other ideal types reviewed here to offer direct HCMs to specific 
firms or sectors to invest overseas in either specific companies or countries. In 
such states, senior managers in firms should be the ones to decide where to invest 
and how to do it. However, that does not mean that such states will not have any 
HCMs, as they do have them (Sauvant et al., 2014). 
74 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS Volume 26, 2019, Number 1
At the other end of the spectrum, dominant-developmental states are the most 
likely to devise direct HCMs with clearly defined eligibility and conditionality 
criteria to guide OFDI in terms of, say, firm type, investment objectives, volume 
and technology acquisition (Pradhan, 2016; Sauvant & Chen, 2014; Sauvant et 
al., 2014). They are, therefore, most likely to establish direct HCMs to encourage 
specific firms or firms more generally in chosen sectors to invest abroad to gain 
knowledge and access to key resources. For instance, the Chinese government 
did not allow private Chinese firms to invest abroad before 2003, so all OFDI came 
from state-owned enterprises (Buckley et al., 2007). The Chinese state promoted 
investment abroad by these companies in specific sectors between 1999 and 2001 
(Buckley et al., 2007). 
The influence of the Chinese state on OFDI has continued in more recent times 
(Rogers, 2019). For example, the China Development Bank, which is a state-owned 
“policy” bank in China that has a remit to provide medium- to long-term funding to 
support the country’s strategic economic objectives, has provided crucial funding 
to some domestic solar photovoltaic companies to enable their development, 
including investments abroad in 2011 (Allen & Allen, 2015). By contrast, the United 
States, in general, has adopted a broader policy to promote investment abroad that 
is consistent across countries (Jackson, 2017); such policies typically focus on the 
provision of information about exporting or investing abroad rather than financial 
support to promote OFDI. However, some United States policies and government 
agencies do favour investments in emerging markets (Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation, 2018). Hence, the role of the state differs between countries, leading 
to variation in HCMs and OFDI. We therefore put forward the following proposition:
P3: The role of the state in the economy will influence HCM variation and thereby 
influence broad OFDI patterns (firm types, volume, location, technology area, mode 
of entry).
One hypothesis that builds on this proposition is that developmental states’ HCMs 
will be both more extensive and more targeted than those in arm’s length states. The 
rationale for this hypothesis is that arm’s length states are likely to provide fewer HCMs 
than developmental states and, with some exceptions we discuss below, HCMs in 
arm’s length states are likely to apply to all companies and all host countries evenly. 
By contrast, HCMs in developmental states are likely to be numerous and focus on 
particular firms and sectors as well as specific host countries. As a consequence of 
this variation, the potential moderating effects of HCMs are likely to be greater for 
developmental states than they are for arm’s length states. 
3.3.4 Sectoral heterogeneity
The fourth and final insight from the CC literature is its emphasis on the importance 
of heterogeneity not just between, but also within different types of national 
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economy (Lane & Wood, 2009; Wood & Lane, 2012). This diversity reflects, in part, 
both the sectoral specificity of state support (Lane & Wood, 2014) and differences 
between firms and their capabilities within any national economy and sector (Allen, 
2013; Whitley, 2007). It also builds on the emphasis within the CC literature that 
institutional configurations are important: to assess the influence of a range of 
institutions – which can vary across companies and sectors – on firm behaviour, 
researchers need to know which specific institutions are applicable to particular 
firms (Allen, 2013). 
This may seem like an obvious point; however, if research applies national ideal 
types to all companies within an economy, important variation can be missed and 
results may be biased. By neglecting such variation, research can inadvertently turn 
abstract ideal types into concrete entities that all companies within an economy 
are assumed to resemble closely. In reality, of course, there is variation among 
firms within any economy in terms of their ownership, control and direction, 
employee representation, types of relationships with suppliers and customers, and 
competition model (Kirchner, 2016).
Even within states, such as the United States, that typically do not intervene with 
companies and how they are run, some specific sectors receive strong government 
support (Block & Keller, 2009; Keller & Block, 2015). For instance, the United 
States Government has given relatively large amounts of funding to companies 
in the defence and biotechnology sectors but very little to companies in other 
economic sectors (Allen, 2013). Thus, the role of the United States Government in 
the economy varies from sector to sector and reflects the economic priorities of the 
federal government.
Applied to HCMs, sectoral heterogeneity suggests that HCMs within a national 
economy are likely to vary substantially across sectors, reflecting the economic 
preferences of the central government (Sauvant et al., 2014). In other words, political 
processes will shape which economic sectors will have HCMs and which will not, 
as well as the characteristics of any HCMs in different sectors. This suggests that 
in order to explain the likely impact of HCM variation we need, first, to understand 
whether national institutions are directed towards the support of particular sectors 
of the economy (Sauvant et al., 2014). 
Moreover, national institutions are likely to influence the form of HCMs in particular 
sectors. For instance, depending on the sector, HCMs may be more direct or 
indirect. Similarly, institutional variation may result in the eligibility and conditionality 
criteria that are attached to HCMs being designed to promote the OFDI strategies 
of firms in specific sectors. In the latter case, an HCM may apply generally to all 
firms in a country but may be relevant only for some of them, perhaps those with 
limited financial resources or no experience of investing overseas. Similarly, firms 
that apply for and receive such support may vary systematically from those that 
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do not (Torres et al., 2016). Furthermore, if firms must meet certain criteria to be 
eligible for HCMs, this may reinforce dominant firm types within an economy, so 
that firms in strategically important sectors benefit the most from HCMs (Sauvant 
& Chen, 2014).  
Even though the United States Government tends to operate at arm’s length from 
individual firms and sectors, as noted above, some sectors receive federal funding 
to promote their growth. In addition, although the federal government does not 
have high-profile policies to promote domestic firms’ OFDI, the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC), a self-sustaining federal government agency, has 
a remit to help United States businesses invest in emerging markets. By doing so, 
it seeks to promote, inter alia, United States foreign policy and national security 
priorities. In 2017, OPIC lent $630 million to foreign energy projects that involved 
United States companies, Approximately 90 per cent of this money went to 
renewable-energy initiatives (Groom, 2018). Hence, even in the United States, 
which is typically viewed as an arm’s length state, some funds are available to 
promote investment abroad and those funds can benefit certain economic sectors 
more than others. Building on this empirical evidence as well as on the theoretical 
arguments outlined above that indicate that firms’ institutional specificities are 
important and that actors and institutions co-constitute each other, we put forward 
the following proposition:
P4: Countries’ HCMs are more relevant to some economic sectors than others. 
As noted above, the role of the state will influence how extensive and targeted 
HCMs are. However, this does not mean that arm’s length states will not have 
any HCMs. It is therefore important to conduct analyses of particular sectors to 
determine how HCMs influence OFDI. Such policies may not play a major role in 
influencing OFDI in general for a country, but could be significant in some sectors 
and for some host countries. A specific hypothesis that follows from this is that, in 
arm’s length states, HCMs are likely to moderate the relationship between firms and 
their OFDI in those sectors that the HCMs apply to, but not other sectors that do 
not have any HCMs.
4. Conclusion and policy implications 
Compared with how state ownership influences OFDI, HCMs have received limited 
attention in the international business literature. Although international business 
research has started to theorize how home-country institutions enable and constrain 
EMNCs’ OFDI, relatively little work has attempted to provide a systematic account 
of HCMs and their effects on OFDI.
We have sought to fill that gap by putting forward a series of general propositions 
and more focused potential hypotheses on the links between HCMs and patterns 
77Home-country measures to support outward foreign direct investment: Variation and consequences
of OFDI. By doing so, this paper makes three theoretical contributions. First, it 
suggests that research should consider HCMs holistically, as individual measures 
are likely to interact with other HCMs; these interactions could increase or impede 
or, by cancelling each other out, not affect OFDI. Second, our research indicates 
that HCMs may have a direct influence on OFDI, and, as HCMs vary between 
different state types, this effect is likely to be greater in developmental states 
than it is in arm’s length ones. We have, therefore, identified an important source 
of HCM variation, which in turn is likely to affect OFDI. At present, much of the 
existing literature downplays how HCMs vary across countries, focusing instead on 
variation in general. As a result, we seek to provide a theoretical grounding for HCM 
variation. Finally, our work provides some boundary conditions about when HCMs 
are likely to influence OFDI. In particular, targeted HCMs in countries in which the 
state typically plays an arm’s length role in the economy, such as the United States 
and the United Kingdom, are likely to apply to firms in a small number of sectors 
and their investments in a few host countries, potentially only emerging-market 
economies. Hence HCMs in some countries are only relevant for particular sectors 
and some host countries; they do not apply to all sectors and all host countries.
In addition, the theoretical implications of our work have consequences for 
policymakers and for future research to assess the impact of HCMs on OFDI. 
First, our research suggests that policymakers and researchers should consider 
the effects of HCMs holistically and sectorally. In other words, HCMs are likely 
to target specific sectors, so assessments of their effects must focus on those 
sectors (Fiedler & Karlsson, 2016). In addition, such assessments must examine 
HCMs collectively – as configurations or “packages” – rather than as individual 
measures to support OFDI, meaning that the interactions between specific HCMs 
will influence their effects on firms. This will complicate those assessments. Creating 
models to examine how the effect of one HCM varies according to the presence 
(or absence) of other HCMs is likely to require (1) information at the firm level to 
know which HCMs they use and how they use them, and (2) analytical techniques 
that can assess how configurations of (or the interactions between) various HCMs 
influence OFDI.
Second, our work suggests that HCMs may alter the strategic priorities of companies, 
influencing where they do and do not invest abroad. Indeed, in many instances, this 
is the raison d’être of HCMs. Assessing their net benefits is, therefore, important. 
For instance, HCMs may boost domestic firms’ OFDI in specific countries, but they 
may reduce it in others. The effects of that shift in OFDI location may have long-
term implications for the international competitiveness of domestic companies that 
policymakers must consider. This has implications for future research, as it suggests 
that some OFDI may be diverted away from some countries and into others. It also 
indicates a need to better understand the motives to invest abroad as a means, in 
part, to meet political objectives and conform to expectations.
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Third, HCMs may merely, in some instances, subsidize domestic firms’ OFDI that 
they would have undertaken in the absence of HCMs. Such assessments of the 
effects of HCMs may be particularly important when examining the link between 
HCMs, OFDI and socioeconomic development in emerging economies. As we 
discussed above, a United States government agency, OPIC, seeks to combine 
OFDI promotion with United States foreign policy objectives and socioeconomic 
development in emerging economies; yet, analyses of OPIC, its HCMs and its 
effects on socioeconomic development in emerging economies are rare. 
Finally, if HCMs seek to promote OFDI, as well as potentially inward FDI (Buzdugan 
& Tüselmann, 2018), as a means to enhance domestic companies’ competitiveness 
by enabling them to tap into resources abroad that are not available at home 
(Ibeh, 2018), policymakers and managers need to be aware of the challenges that 
operating across multiple sites will create within one organization (Whitley, 2010b). 
Integrating and coordinating activities that are geographically dispersed, to create 
and sustain competencies within a single organization, an MNE, is likely to pose 
significant organizational and managerial challenges (Gilmore, Andersson & Memar, 
2018; Narula, 2014; Rugman & Verbeke, 1993; Whitley, 2005b). Companies will 
need to be able to develop organizational capabilities to surmount these, potentially 
affecting how employees in different locations are managed and how extensive 
organizational careers for different types of employees can be (Whitley, 2005b). 
For instance, domestic firms that acquire leading technical or scientific capabilities 
abroad need to ensure that those highly skilled employees who help to constitute 
key capabilities stay with the firm. To do so, domestic firms may need to open up 
senior managerial positions to employees from abroad; this may not always be easy 
(Allen et al., 2018; Whitley, 2012). Consequently, policymakers, if they implement 
HCMs to improve domestic firms’ competitiveness, will have to assess how well 
HCMs actually enable those firms to create new capabilities or extend existing 
ones rather than simply whether or not firms use HCMs (Knoerich, 2015). In short, 
encouraging domestic firms to invest abroad may be one thing; ensuring that they 
use that investment to boost their competitiveness another. Policymakers will, 
therefore, need to ensure that they have the means to assess firms’ capabilities if 
they wish to use HCMs to boost domestic firms’ competitiveness. Future research 
can help to provide the basis of that assessment.
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